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ABSTRACT
The controversy surrounding NFL player Colin Kaepernick’s act
of kneeling during the national anthem in protest of police brutality
against people of color continues to permeate public discourse. In
March 2017, President Trump referenced Colin Kaepernick’s
symbolic act during a rally in Louisville, Kentucky, in an effort to
illustrate his strong opposition to anyone kneeling during the national
anthem. In this speech, President Trump stated that although many
NFL franchise owners were interested in signing Colin Kaepernick,
many were afraid of receiving a nasty tweet from him. Likewise, in
another speech, President Trump stated, “I think it’s a great lack of
respect and appreciation for our country and I really think they
should try another country, see if they like it better.” Although
President Trump is referring to professional athletes in both of the
aforementioned public statements, what about the thousands of
students who participated in the nationwide walkout to protest gun
violence in the aftermath of the Parkland school shooting? Or the
hundreds of youth football players that are kneeling during the
national anthem in an effort to mimic their professional idols?
This article takes the position that students have the constitutional
right under the First Amendment to engage in expressive activities,
political speech, and symbolic speech without interference or censor
*
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from the state. Certainly, schools can educate, but they cannot
indoctrinate based on a prescribed orthodoxy. Therefore, any
attempts to limit or discipline students from participating in
expressive activities, such as social protests, in K-12 schools that
does not cause a material disruption to the learning environment is
unconstitutional. Currently, students’ First Amendment rights in K12 schools reside in a sea of ambiguity where the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that students are considered ‘persons’ under our
Constitution and thus entitled to fundamental rights, such as freedom
of expression, yet in the same vein marginalize those same rights in
subsequent decisions by permitting school authorities to limit
freedom of speech under certain circumstances. This article offers a
path toward safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights to engage
in expressive activities, political speech and symbolic speech in K-12
schools by amending existing anti-Hazelwood statutes to explicitly
include protections for student social protests, as long as such
conduct does not cause a material disruption to the school learning
environment. Furthermore, the proposed amendment to antiHazelwood statutes will limit the reach of Tinker’s Material
Disruption Standard so that school officials do not have unbridled
discretion to censor student expression.
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INTRODUCTION
“NFL owners don’t want to pick him up because they don’t want
to get a nasty tweet from Donald Trump . . . [the American people]
like it when people actually stand for the American flag.”1 Trump
Rally, Louisville, Kentucky.
The controversy surrounding NFL player Colin Kaepernick’s act
of kneeling during the national anthem in protest of police brutality
against people of color continues to permeate public discourse.2 In
March 2017, President Trump referenced Colin Kaepernick’s
symbolic act during a rally in Louisville, Kentucky, to illustrate his
strong opposition to anyone kneeling during the national anthem.3 In
this speech, President Trump stated that although many NFL
franchise owners were interested in signing Colin Kaepernick, many
were afraid of receiving a nasty tweet from the President.4 A recent
report substantiated President Trump’s beliefs, revealing that several
NFL teams were interested in signing Colin Kaepernick to their
rosters but feared the “Trump Effect,” which is the backlash that may
result if President Trump sends a tweet condemning the NFL owner’s
1. John Wagner, Trump Takes Another Shot at Quarterback Who Wouldn’t Stand for National
Anthem,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
20,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2017/03/20/trump-takes-a-renewed-shot-at-quarterback-who-wouldnt-stand-for-nationalanthem/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.eac6f11a6c10 [https://perma.cc/56M3-WQAQ].
2. John Branch, National Anthem Protests Sidelined by Ambiguity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/sports/nfl-national-anthem-protests.html [https://perma.cc/7CCLJKBN].
3. Wagner, supra note 1.
4. Live On-Air News, President Trump Takes Shot at Colin Kaepernick During Louisville Rally,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hyI5R3FCfQ [https://perma.cc/M9S7C6X4].

Published by Reading Room,

3

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1

254

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

decision.5 Likewise, in another speech, President Trump stated, “I
think it’s a great lack of respect and appreciation for our country[,]
and I really said they should try another country, see if they like it
better.”6 Although President Trump is referring to professional
athletes in both of the aforementioned public statements, what about
the thousands of students who participated in the nationwide walkout
to protest gun violence in the aftermath of the Parkland school
shooting?7 Or the hundreds of youth football players who are
kneeling during the playing of the national anthem at high school
athletic events in an effort to mimic their professional idols?8 Should
these youth be in fear of being the subject of a disapproving tweet
from President Trump? Should they, too, consider living in another
country? Should high school students in public schools have the same
constitutional freedom-of-expression rights to engage in expressive
activities, political speech, and symbolic speech as adults? This
article addresses these crucial legal questions.
In today’s polarizing political climate, youth are choosing to take a
more prominent role in social activism through their political speech,
expressive activities, and symbolic conduct.9 For example, students
5. See Joe DePaolo, ‘A Desperate Act’: Watch Skip Bayless Condemn Trump for Taking Shots at
Colin
Kaepernick
During
Rally,
MEDIATE
(Mar.
21,
2017,
2:31
PM),
http://www.mediaite.com/online/a-desperate-act-watch-skip-bayless-condemn-trump-for-taking-shotsat-colin-kaepernick-during-rally/ [https://perma.cc/UUB5-CVE7].
6. Jordan Heck, Donald Trump: Colin Kaepernick, Other Protesters in NFL, Should Leave the
Country, SPORTINGNEWS (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/donald-trumpnfl-players-protest-on-911-marcus-peters-dolphins-seahawks/1x6muxaepfnyw1vxy2ywylseoa
[https://perma.cc/HB2R-X6VF].
7. Peter Weber, Students Nationwide Plan to Walk Out of Class Today to Protest Gun Violence,
WEEK (Mar. 14, 2018), http://theweek.com/speedreads/760867/students-nationwide-plan-walk-classtoday-protest-gun-violence [https://perma.cc/722V-QFAN]. Schools are mixed on whether they will
support or discipline. See id. The ACLU says the schools “can discipline students for leaving class
[without permission] to protest but [cannot] make the punishment any harsher because [of the] political
nature of the walkout.” Id.
8. Bob Cook, Youth Athletes, Again, Take a Knee During National Anthem, FORBES (Sept. 26,
2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2017/09/26/youth-athletes-again-take-a-kneeduring-national-anthem/#5ae9ee0e708e [https://perma.cc/Z4L9-UFK5].
9. Ashraf Khalil & Calvin Woodward, Thousands Gather Across U.S. to March for Gun Control
and
Spark
Activism,
DENVER
POST
(Mar.
24,
2018,
8:52
AM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/03/24/thousands-gather-gun-control-us/
[https://perma.cc/F5LR3QUX] (“Summoned by high school students swept up in school violence, thousands swarmed into the
nation’s capital and cities across America on Saturday to march for gun control and ignite political
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who survived the tragic school shooting at Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, in which seventeen
students were killed, organized a national school walkout in protest
of gun violence.10 This heroic show of activism by students led to the
national March for Our Lives rally in our nation’s capital for gun
control legislation.11 Similarly, high school student athletes around
the country are kneeling during the national anthem in protest of
police brutality against people of color.12 However, unlike Colin
Kaepernick, their symbolic expression often has immediate adverse
consequences. For example, Mike Oppong, a football player at
Doherty High School in Worcester, Massachusetts, received a onegame suspension for kneeling during the national anthem in
solidarity with Colin Kaepernick to protest police brutality against
people of color.13 Similarly, another student, Dylan Bruton, was
suspended from Bishop Gorman High School in Las Vegas, Nevada,
and placed on a disciplinary contract for kneeling during the national
anthem.14 Although these two high school athletes are located in
different geographic regions of the country, they both represent the
disturbing trend of school leaders infringing on students’ freedom of
activism among the young.”); Vivian Yee & Alan Blinder, National School Walkout: Thousands Protest
Against
Gun
Violence
Across
the
U.S.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
14,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/us/school-walkout.html [https://perma.cc/RP3V-YU7N] (“Even
after a year of near continuous protesting—for women, for the environment, for immigrants and more—
the emergence of people not even old enough to drive as a political force has been particularly arresting,
unsettling a gun control debate that had seemed impervious to other factors.”).
10. Peter Jamison et al., ‘Never again!’ Students Demand Action Against Gun Violence in Nation’s
Capital, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/march-for-our-liveshuge-crowds-gather-for-rally-against-gun-violence-in-nations-capital/2018/03/24/4121b100-2f7d-11e8b0b0-f706877db618_story.html?utm_term=.fa4708207683 [https://perma.cc/L4T3-3LPJ] (“Hundreds of
thousands of demonstrators gathered in the nation’s capital and cities across the country Saturday to
demand action against gun violence, vividly displaying the strength of the political movement led by
survivors of a school massacre in Parkland, Fla.”); Yee & Blinder, supra note 9.
11. Jamison, supra note 10.
12. Emmett Knowlton, High School Player Suspended for Kneeling During Anthem Has Suspension
Lifted
After
Public
Outcry,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Sep.
12,
2016,
10:15
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/high-school-football-player-suspended-kneeling-during-nationalanthem-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/TEE4-66R8].
13. Id.
14. Mahsa Saeidi, High School Football Player Suspended for National Anthem Protest, NBC 26
(Nov. 23, 2016, 1:39 AM), http://www.nbc26.com/news/national/bishop-gorman-football-playersuspended-for-national-anthem-protest [https://perma.cc/2KPV-WW9R].
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expression rights.15 Likewise, school administrators had varied
responses to students participating in school walkouts in protest of
gun violence.16 Some administrators supported student walkouts and
allowed students to return to school without admonishment, whereas
others emphasized that leaving school without permission would
result in swift disciplinary sanctions.17
Currently, students’ First Amendment rights in K–12 schools
reside in a sea of ambiguity,18 where the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that students are considered “persons” under the
Constitution and, thus, are entitled to fundamental rights, such as
freedom of expression,19 yet in the same vein marginalize those
fundamental rights in a series of decisions that expand school
administrators’ authority to limit students’ free speech.20 Thus,
although the Court posits that neither teachers nor students relinquish
their constitutional freedom of speech and expression rights at the
15. Knowlton, supra note 12; Saeidi, supra note 14.
16. Camila Domonoske, Across the Country, Students Walk Out to Protest Gun Violence, NPR (Mar.
14, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/14/593433911/across-thecountry-students-walk-out-to-protest-gun-violence [https://perma.cc/92EJ-UQKL] (“Various school
districts also face different responses from administrators. Some have told students they won’t punish
walkout participants. Others emphasize that normal school rules are still in place, and leaving class or
campus without permission will result in disciplinary action.”).
17. Id.
18. Over time, the Court has acknowledged that children are entitled to the same constitutional
protections as adults, yet it undermined those various protections through a series of limitations and
exceptions. In New Jersey v. T. L. O., the court held that children are entitled to Fourth Amendment
prohibitions from unreasonable search and seizures by public school officials. New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985). However, the court severely marginalized those Fourth Amendment
prohibitions by allowing public school officials to conduct searches based on reasonable suspicion as
opposed to applying the higher standard required for adult searches by state actors, which is probable
cause. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the execution of a fifteen-year-old. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). Whereas in
Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court established that sixteen and seventeen-year-old minors may be eligible
for the death penalty depending on the crime. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). Thus, the
Court acknowledged that children are “persons” and entitled to constitutional protections, yet it
mandated a series of standards that undermine those very protections. See id.; see also Andrew D. M.
Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 626 (2002)
(highlighting a series of exceptions to students’ free speech protections).
19. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
20. See Miller, supra note 18, at 626. It is important to note that the First Amendment safeguards the
infringement of students’ rights by the state, not private actors. See id. Therefore, free speech
jurisprudence applies to public schools, but not private schools. See id. Thus, this article focuses on
students’ First Amendment rights in K–12 public schools.
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schoolhouse door, the reality is students are denied the full extent of
First Amendment protections afforded to adults.21 Because students
are arguably one of the most vulnerable sectors of our society, they
should be afforded equal, if not more, constitutional protections than
adults to ensure they are in a safe learning environment that
adequately prepares them to actively participate in democracy.
Limiting students’ constitutional protections in schools denies them
the opportunity to fully understand the extent of their substantive
rights as adults.
This essay takes the position that students have the constitutional
right under the First Amendment to engage in expressive activities,
political speech, and symbolic speech without interference or
censorship from the state. Certainly, schools can educate, but they
cannot indoctrinate based on a prescribed orthodoxy. Therefore, any
attempts to limit or discipline students from participating in
expressive activities, such as social protests, in K–12 schools that do
not cause a material disruption to the learning environment are
unconstitutional. School authorities’ interpretation of students’
constitutional right to engage in social protests has been
antithetical.22 Some school authorities not only support but encourage
21. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost fifty years.”).
22. Evie Blad, Can Schools Punish Students for Protesting the National Anthem?, PBS NEWS HOUR
(Oct. 7, 2016, 2:03 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/schools-students-protesting-nationalanthem/ [https://perma.cc/MB88-UA3A]. Whether students who choose to kneel during the national
anthem are disciplined largely depends on whether the school administrator approves of the symbolic
conduct, with little consideration for the students’ First Amendment rights. Id. For example, studentsatheletes attending Parkway High School in Louisiana who choose to kneel during the national anthem
will be punished by being removed from the team, whereas student-athletes attending Centerville High
School in Ohio may kneel during the national anthem without fear of disciplinary action. Jacob Bogage,
Louisiana High School Will Kick Students Off Team if They Don’t Stand for National Anthem, WASH.
POST (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/09/28/louisiana-highschool-will-kick-students-off-team-if-they-dont-stand-for-national-anthem/?utm_term=.5c2e87159f4a
[https://perma.cc/PH89-NTA4]; Dana Smith, High School on Students Kneeling During National
Anthem, WDTN (Dec. 29, 2017, 6:15 PM), http://wdtn.com/2017/09/29/high-school-on-studentskneeling-during-national-anthem/ [https://perma.cc/9ALS-AQ5Q]. The principal of Centerville High
stated, “I personally am disheartening [sic] when people [kneel during the national anthem] but that’s
because I choose to stand so that people have the right to freedom of expression and if they choose to
kneel then that’s what I’m standing for.” Id.
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students to exercise their freedom of expression,23 whereas other
school leaders issue disciplinary sanctions to any student engaging in
social protests during school activities.24 As a result, every school
year, potentially thousands of students are at risk for having their
freedom-of-expression rights violated by overzealous school
administrators who impose disciplinary sanctions upon students who
engage in social protests.25 This essay offers a path toward
safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights to engage in
expressive activities, political speech, and symbolic speech in K–12
schools by amending existing anti-Hazelwood statutes to explicitly
include protections for student social protests, as long as such
conduct does not cause a material disruption to the school learning
environment. Furthermore, the proposed amendment to antiHazelwood statutes will limit the reach of Tinker’s material
disruption standard to help ensure school officials do not have
unbridled discretion to censor student expression. The adoption of
anti-Hazelwood legislation was an effort by some states to shield
students from the harmful effects of the Court’s decision to limit
students’ freedom-of-expression rights in Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier.26 In this landmark decision, the Court established that
school authorities may censor education-related speech.27
Concomitantly, the Hazelwood decision and the First Amendment
establish the minimum constitutional protections afforded to
students; however, states may, through progressive legislation like
anti-Hazelwood statutes, expand students’ free speech protections.28

23. See Blad, supra note 22.
24. Id.
25. High
School
Facts
at
a
Glance,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ovae/pi/hs/hsfacts.html [https://perma.cc/7EFY-KV38] (last
visited Mar. 20, 2018). According to the U.S. Department of Education, there are over 26,000 secondary
schools in the United States. Id.
26. Bruce L. Plopper, A Synthesis Model for Passing State Student Press Legislation, 51
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. EDUCATOR 61, 61 (1996).
27. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1987) (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
28. Plopper, supra note 26, at 61.
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The proposed legislative solution would restore the expansive free
speech rights established in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,29 thereby shielding students from
unlawful infringements on their First Amendment rights by
audacious administrators. This approach balances the educational
mission of the school and the expressive free speech rights of
students. Part I of this essay discusses the growing trend of school
authorities violating students’ First Amendment rights by prohibiting
them from engaging in social protests, such as kneeling during the
national anthem, to indoctrinate them into a proscribed orthodoxy.30
Part II discusses the existing free speech jurisprudence for assessing
students’ freedom-of-expression rights in K–12 schools and how it
fails to adequately safeguard students from viewpoint
discrimination.31 Part III highlights the evolution of anti-Hazelwood
statutes and the implications for students’ free speech rights.32 Part
IV proposes an innovative statutory solution to safeguard students’
free speech rights by amending existing anti-Hazelwood statutes to
create more expansive freedom-of-expression rights for students in
K–12 schools.33 The proposed solution would help protect students
from school authorities who engage in viewpoint discrimination
under the guise of school discipline and order.
I. The Rise of Social Activism in K–12 Schools
A renaissance of political and social activism is currently emerging
among K–12 schools as students protest a myriad of controversial
issues affecting their communities.34 Students’ efforts to promote
substantive change through informal democratic mobilizations has
ignited a sea of controversy as school authorities struggle to find a
balance between maintaining school safety and discipline while
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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preserving students’ freedom of expression rights.35 Student activism
is not a new phenomenon but rather has been an intricate part of the
K–12 education landscape.36 Historically, students have played a
significant role in social movements through their efforts to help
dismantle systemic inequalities within society such as desegregation
in K–12 public schools, voting rights, the Vietnam War, and police
brutality.37 For example, in 1963 more than 200,000 students in
Chicago Public Schools organized a one-day boycott in protest of
racially-segregated schools.38
Similarly, one year later over 450,000 African-American and
Puerto Rican students protested segregation and inequality in the
New York City public school system.39 Students have also
participated in social activism through the Black Lives Matter
movement, which is a campaign against violence and systemic
racism directed toward people of color by law enforcement.40 The
current wave of student activism permeating K–12 schools is in
response to increased instances of police brutality against African
Americans and the tragic school shooting at Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida.41 Students who survived
35. See Domonoske, supra note 16; supra text accompanying note 7.
36. Melinda D. Anderson, The Other Student Activists, ATLANTIC (Nov. 23, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/11/student-activism-history-injustice/417129/
[https://perma.cc/VQZ8-UWN8].
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Black Lives Matter and Respectability Politics in
Local News Accounts of Officer-Involved Civilian Deaths: An Early Empirical Assessment, 2016 WIS.
L. REV. 541, 541 (2016) (“As a social movement, Black Lives Matter can be understood as growing out
of a specific opposition to respectability politics by insisting that regardless of any ostensibly nonrespectable behavior—from Martin’s hoodie to Eric Garner selling loose cigarettes—their lives matter
and should not be treated with deadly force.”); see also Corinthia A. Carter, Police Brutality, the Law &
Today’s Social Justice Movement: How the Lack of Police Accountability Has Fueled #Hashtag
Activism, 20 CUNY L. REV. 521, 523 (2017) (“The Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) movement and others
are products of the continued failure of this country’s legislature and judiciary to enact and apply laws
that effectively address the racially driven violence that police officers commit against Blacks. BLM
calls for a complete reform in policing policies as well as true accountability for police departments that
systematically violate the rights of Black individuals.”).
41. Leah Shafer, Student Activism and Gun Control, HARV. GRADUATE SCH. EDUC. (Feb. 25, 2018),
https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/uk/18/02/student-activism-and-gun-control [https://perma.cc/2V64KHQW].
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the shooting in Parkland, Florida, have become the new face of
school safety and gun control as they petition lawmakers to enact
tougher gun restrictions through a series of political protests.42 For
instance, students organized the National Walkout Day, which
encouraged high school students throughout the country to walk out
of their schools to advocate for federal gun reform legislation.43
Furthermore, survivors of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
School shooting also organized a national March for Our Lives rally
at the National Mall in Washington, D.C., and over 800 other
simultaneous marches in cities across the nation such as Chicago,
Miami, and Dallas, to protest gun violence in schools.44
As previously mentioned, a great deal of student activism in K–12
schools has ensued around another important social issue—police
brutality against black males.45 Last season, high school football
players across the nation kneeled during the national anthem in
solidarity with former NFL player Colin Kaepernick and his efforts
to increase awareness about police brutality.46 National anthem
42. Id.
43. Christal Hayes, Students Plan to Walk Out of Schools to Protest Gun Laws, USA TODAY (Feb.
18, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/02/17/students-teachers-planning-nationwidewalkout-protest-gun-control-inaction-students-fed-up-they-plan/348752002/
[https://perma.cc/U8U5GHLJ].
44. March for Our Lives Highlight: Students Protesting Guns Say ‘Enough is Enough,’ N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
24,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/24/us/march-for-our-lives.html
[https://perma.cc/CV3S-HG8H] (“Demonstrators flooded streets across the globe in public protests on
Saturday, calling for action against gun violence. Hundreds of thousands of marchers turned out, in the
most ambitious show of force yet from a student-driven movement that emerged after the recent
massacre at a South Florida high school.”); see also Sarah Gray, The March for Our Lives Protest is
This Saturday. Here’s Everything to Know, TIME (Feb. 20, 2018), http://time.com/5167102/march-forour-lives-parkland-school-shooting-protest/ [https://perma.cc/N44K-94AU].
45. Carter, supra note 40, at 523.
46. Brenna Kelly, Lincoln HS Students Take a Knee During the National Anthem to Protest Racial
Injustice, FOX 12 OR. (Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.kptv.com/story/36706433/lincoln-hs-students-take-aknee-during-national-anthem-to-protest-racial-injustice [https://perma.cc/TQ3T-3VWY]. A group of
more than 60 students, which included football players, at Lincoln High School in Portland, Oregon,
kneeled during the national anthem while holding signs that read “Racial Justice Now.” Id.; see also
Gregory Pratt, Dan Shalin & Steve Shering, As Protests During Anthem Reach High Schools, a
‘Teaching Moment’ for Some Coaches, CHI. TRI. (Sept. 29, 2017, 9:43 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-high-school-anthem-protests-met-20170929story.html [https://perma.cc/AGC5-SS2M]; Alex Samuels, The Anthem, the Pledge and the Protests: A
National Debate Comes to Texas Schools, TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 3, 2017, 1:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/11/03/texas-school-kids-join-national-debate-protest-during-anthem-
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protests provided students with the opportunity to have a voice on the
issues impacting their communities. However, as national anthem
protests and other instances of social activism, such as school
walkouts, became more prevalent in the K–12 landscape, school
authorities struggled to determine the correct response to students’
symbolic expression.47 School authorities either could discipline
students for engaging in national anthem protests or support students’
conduct as an exercise of their First Amendment freedom of
expression rights.48 Either course of action places school
administrators at risk of public backlash and criticism from the
communities in which they serve due to the sea of controversy
surrounding these issues.49 For example, a Kansas City school’s
disciplinary response to student protests was heavily criticized by
members of the local community as evidenced by the following quote
from a citizen interviewed by the media: “To punish 150 students for
standing up for what they believe in respectably and on school
property . . . doesn’t seem too just. We protest out of necessity for
change, not the novelty of just missing school.”50 Similar public
criticisms were directed toward school officials in Long Island, New
York, for disciplinary sanctions issued to students participating in the

pledge/ [https://perma.cc/DW6L-UQFS] (“As the national debate continues to rage, similar
demonstrations are taking place at the grade school level. There have been reports in Texas school
districts of students and teachers kneeling during the national anthem or sitting during the pledge—
something that, while legal, has stirred controversy.”). High school football players in Oak Park and
Evanston schools kneeled during the national anthem to protest social injustice. Id.
47. See Blad, supra note 22. School administrators had different interpretations regarding whether
students kneeling during the national anthem was protected speech or unprotected speech that warranted
disciplinary action. Id. As a result, some students were disciplined for kneeling during the national
anthem, whereas others were permitted to engage in the symbolic conduct. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Jennifer Angiesta, CNN Poll: Americans Split on Anthem Protests, CNN POLITICS
(Sept. 30, 2017, 2:49 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/29/politics/national-anthem-nfl-cnnpoll/index.html [https://perma.cc/5EJT-M4F7]; see also Sophie Tatum, Athletes, Activists Spar on
Kneeling National Anthem Protests, CNN POLITICS (Sept. 28, 2017, 4:20 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/27/politics/cnn-nfl-kneeling-protests-town-hall-ac360/index.html
[https://perma.cc/SMR4-JY2W].
50. Max Londberg, Students at This KC School Were Disciplined for Honoring Parkland Victims
with
Walkout,
KAN.
CITY
STAR
(Mar.
14,
2018,
2:00
PM),
http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article205246334.html [https://perma.cc/HAL6-LK9D].

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss2/1

12

McNeal: Hush Don't Say a Word: Safeguarding Student's Freedom of Expressi

2019]

HUSH DON'T SAY A WORD

263

National Walkout Day in protest of gun violence.51 In this instance,
not only did community members express opposition to disciplining
students for participating in the school walkout, the Governor of New
York, Andrew Cuomo, released a public statement condemning any
disciplinary action and urged the state education commissioner to
intervene on the students’ behalf.52 The potential public backlash for
school administrators’ disciplinary actions surrounding controversial
issues is even more apparent regarding national anthem protests.53 It
is a well-established American tradition and patriotic ritual for
spectators to stand at sporting events during the playing of the
national anthem to show respect for the American flag and the
soldiers who risked their lives to uphold the freedom the flag
represents.54 Therefore, kneeling—as opposed to standing—during
the playing of the national anthem is perceived by many individuals,
which includes some school administrators, as offensive and
disrespectful.55 Those in opposition of individuals kneeling during
the playing of the national anthem assert that permitting this type of
symbolic speech in schools teaches students to be disrespectful,
especially regarding honoring the men and women who have served
in the military.56 In contrast, those in support of students’ ability to
participate in national anthem protests posit that schools should be a
training ground for democracy and encourage civic engagement

51. National Walkout Day Punishments Met with Backlash, NEWS 12 LONG ISLAND (Mar. 15, 2018,
2:59 PM), http://longisland.news12.com/story/37735079/national-walkout-day-punishments-met-withbacklash [https://perma.cc/G9HZ-PLHG] [hereinafter National Walkout Day].
52. Id.
53. Evie Blad, Taking a Stand: How Schools Should Respond to National-Anthem Protests, EDUC.
WK. (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/10/05/taking-a-stand-how-schoolsshould-respond.html [https://perma.cc/WZ57-U9TT].
54. See Mark Strasser, Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement, and the Marsh Wild
Card, 40 IND. L. REV. 529, 534 (2007) (equating standing for the national anthem with showing “respect
for the government.”).
55. Id.
56. David B. Larter, Legendary SEAL Leader: National Anthem Protests Disrespect the Military,
NAVY TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2016/09/09/legendary-sealleader-national-anthem-protests-disrespect-the-military/ [https://perma.cc/YP3G-LVBY].
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among students regarding issues impacting their communities such as
gun control legislation.57
The increased instances of political protests in schools have placed
school administrators and students at the heart of the debate
regarding the extent of students’ freedom-of-expression rights in K–
12 schools.58 School administrators, like the general public, have
differing views on the appropriateness of student protests in K–12
schools.59 Some school authorities not only support but encourage
students to engage in social activism to advocate for reform regarding
issues impacting their communities,60 whereas others issue sanctions
or implement policies prohibiting the expressive conduct at issue.61
Additionally, the severity and scope of disciplinary sanctions issued
to students have varied immensely among school districts, which
raises concerns among stakeholders regarding issues of equity and
fairness.62 For example, several students at a Kansas City school
were marked truant for leaving their classrooms without permission
57. Athena Jones & Tom LoBianco, Obama: Colin Kaepernick ‘Exercising Constitutional Right,’
CNN POLITICS (Sept. 5, 2016, 10:40 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/05/politics/barack-obamacolin-kaepernick/ [https://perma.cc/7N7G-3TYT]; see also Chris Biderman, Colin Kaepernick is
Exercising His Rights, Whether You Agree or Not, NINERSWIRE (Aug. 27, 2016, 5:56 PM),
http://ninerswire.usatoday.com/2016/08/27/colin-kaepernick-is-exercising-his-rights-whether-youragree-or-not/ [https://perma.cc/VVP3-MMKM].
58. Eric Russell, High School Athletes, Officials Confront National Anthem Protests, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD (Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.pressherald.com/2017/09/26/high-school-athletes-andofficials-confront-national-anthem-protests/ [https://perma.cc/S24M-XZ56] (“High school athletes,
coaches and administrators across Maine are grappling with the increasingly bitter debate over whether
kneeling during the national anthem is an acceptable form of protest.”); see also Kyle Neddenriep, Some
Indiana High Schools Weigh Pregame Protest Phenomenon, INDYSTAR (Sept. 28, 2017, 4:31 PM),
https://www.indystar.com/story/sports/high-school/2017/09/28/some-indiana-high-schools-weighpregame-protest-phenomenon/712907001/ [https://perma.cc/6KL3-CYXC] (“[T]his is as polarizing of
an issue as [one local athletic director] has seen in his time as an administrator. ‘I’m afraid of what could
happen . . . . What happens if adults in the bleachers get mad? You’ve got a bad situation on your hands.
It’s an emotional topic.’”).
59. See Cory Turner & Clare Lombardo, How School Walkouts Test Student Rights and School
Responsibilities,
NPR
(Mar.
13,
2018,
6:00
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/03/13/591858922/how-school-walkouts-test-student-rights-andschool-responsibilities [https://perma.cc/3QEZ-F9V2].
60. Talia Richman, Educators Take ‘Black Lives Matter’ Message into Baltimore Schools, BALT.
SUN (Feb. 8, 2018, 3:55 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/education/bs-md-ci-blacklives-matter-schools-20180206-story.html [https://perma.cc/M7N8-HHK9].
61. Turner & Lombardo, supra note 59.
62. Id.
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to participate in a school walkout in protest of gun violence and the
lack of gun control legislation.63 Whereas, students attending Cobb
County high schools in Georgia received a much harsher
punishment—a one-day suspension—for participating in the same
type of walkout in protest of gun violence.64 The aforementioned
examples of inequity in student disciplinary sanctions help illustrate
the need for greater free speech protections for students.
Student-athletes who participated in national anthem protests during
school athletic events also received varying disciplinary sanctions
despite committing the same alleged infraction.65 For example, Dylan
Bruton was placed on a disciplinary contract and suspended from his
Nevada high school for kneeling during the anthem.66 Whereas,
another student, a football player at Doherty Memorial High School
in Massachusetts, only received a one-game suspension for his
national anthem protest.67 Clearly, suspension from school is a much
harsher sanction than a one-game suspension because the suspended
child is being deprived of the opportunity to learn for the duration of
the suspension.68 Issuing different disciplinary sanctions to similarlysituated students for the same behavior is unjust and fundamentally
unfair.69 It is a contradiction for school authorities to encourage
students to treat all people equally when they do not adhere to those
same sentiments.
Despite some of the aforementioned negative responses to student
protests, the school leaders in Baltimore Public Schools provide a
salient example of how schools that provide a platform for student
63. Londberg, supra note 50.
64. Vanessa McCray, Some Cobb Students Disciplined for Walking Out, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar.
21, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-education/some-cobb-students-disciplined-for-walkingout/YQEZ188OVxdfPCAd3pDCrM/ [https://perma.cc/5V6Q-BGGQ].
65. See Blad, supra note 53.
66. Saeidi, supra note 14.
67. Knowlton, supra note 12.
68. See Blad, supra note 53; JUSTCHILDREN PROGRAM, Suspended Progress: The Harms of
Suspension & Expulsion, LEGAL AID JUST. CENT. (May 2016), https://www.justice4all.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/Quotes.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6TV-Q6PC]; National Walkout Day, supra note
51.
69. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, K–12 EDUCATION: DISCIPLINE DISPARITIES FOR BLACK
STUDENTS, BOYS, AND STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES (2018) [hereinafter K–12 EDUCATION REPORT].
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activism enable students to freely express themselves and learn how
to fully participate in the democratic process without fear of
reprimand.70 In Baltimore, several schools organized an event called
Black Lives Matter Week of Action in Schools to affirm the value of
black lives within their schools and communities.71 As part of the
initiative, the schools’ uniform mandates were waived so students
could wear Black Lives Matters t-shirts to support the movement.72
In a similar show of support, the entire coaching staff at Woodrow
Wilson High School in New Jersey kneeled during the national
anthem with their football team to show solidarity with Colin
Kaepernick and their students’ efforts to increase awareness about
police brutality.73 Although the level of support demonstrated by
some school officials for student activism is commendable, it is
important to acknowledge the potentially harmful effects of school
officials participating in students’ symbolic expression. Specifically,
the act of an entire coaching staff taking part in a student-led national
anthem protest may unintentionally cause student athletes in
opposition of kneeling during the playing of the national anthem to
feel pressured to participate.74 The coaches’ actions may be perceived
as an attempt to indoctrinate students into a particular orthodoxy,
which is a practice strictly prohibited by the Constitution.75
The aforementioned examples of school administrators’ responses
to student national anthem protests demonstrate the immense
disparity in how K–12 school authorities respond to expressive
activities, political speech, and symbolic conduct. Currently,
students’ First Amendment freedom-of-expression rights in K–12
schools are ambiguous and, thus, subject to multiple interpretations
by public school officials. It is apparent that the current legal
70. See Richman, supra note 60.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Rachaell Davis, This High School Football Coach Planned to Kneel Alone During National
Anthem—Then This Happened, ESSENCE (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.essence.com/2016/09/12/highschool-football-team-knee-support-kaepernick [https://perma.cc/Z4XP-SZX7].
74. Id.
75. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397–98 (2007).
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framework fails to protect students from unwarranted censorship by
school authorities.76 Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that students are considered persons under the Constitution and, thus,
entitled to freedom of expression rights, the Court marginalizes those
same rights in subsequent decisions that expand school
administrators’ abilities to censor student speech.77 As a result, the
Court has failed to adequately safeguard students’ constitutional
freedoms by leaving the preservation of students’ rights to the
discretion of overzealous school administrators who utilize their
discretionary power to usurp student rights under the guise of school
discipline.78 Schools should provide students with the opportunity to
not only learn about their constitutional freedoms but to practice
them so they can be civically-engaged adults. Furthermore, it is
contrary to fundamental conceptions of fairness to acknowledge that
students are afforded constitutional protections yet limit the scope of
those very protections. This is especially problematic because the
First Amendment is devoid of any age restrictions to exercising those
rights. Therefore, students should be afforded the same freedom-ofexpression rights as adults. In light of the gross disparities in whether
students are disciplined for expressive activities, political speech, or
symbolic conduct, it is of paramount importance to address the
quandary surrounding the scope of students’ freedom-of-expression
rights and adopt a substantive legal solution.

76. Frank D. LoMonte, Symposium, Shrinking Tinker: Students Are ‘Persons’ Under Our
Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 AM. U.L. REV. 1323, 1339 (2009) (citing Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
77. Id.
78. Anna Boksenbaum, Shedding Your Soul at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Chilling of Student
Artistic Speech in the Post-Columbine Era, 8 CUNY L. REV. 123, 135 (2005) (“The Court’s decision
that sexually suggestive speech was unprotected by the First Amendment dealt a serious blow to
Tinker’s liberal approach, as it gave deference to school administrators to decide what kind of speech is
permissible in school and gave schools responsibility for inculcating students into community morals
and standards of behavior.”).
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II. Free Speech jurisprudence in K–12 schools
The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech is an essential
component to promoting and maintaining a democratic society by
protecting individuals’ rights to freedom of speech, expression, press,
and assembly.79 At the heart of the First Amendment is the notion
that our society should serve as a marketplace of ideas where
individuals are encouraged to critically analyze diverse perspectives
and solutions to societal issues.80 Under the marketplace doctrine, the
First Amendment “serves as a protector of democracy by promoting
the public discussion of competing ideas and by increasing the
People’s participation in society . . . .”81 To this end, civic education
in schools plays an important role in inculcating students with the
core principles of freedom of speech and expression to enable
students to fully participate in formal and informal democratic
processes.82 In a world faced with increasing political, social, and
79. Lauren E. Tanner, Note, Rights and Regulations: Academic Freedom and a University’s Right to
Regulate the Student Press, 86 TEX. L. REV. 421, 421 (2007).
80. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (discussing the role of schools as a marketplace of ideas and that
students’ freedom of expression is essential for the free exchange of ideas); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 602–03 (1967); see also Stephen C. Jacques, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, the
First Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 1945, 1949–50 (1997) (“Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes posited that the primary goal of the First Amendment is to
guarantee a ‘marketplace of ideas,’ where truth and honest debate emerge from a multiplicity of
voices. The marketplace doctrine suggests that the First Amendment serves as a protector of democracy
by promoting the public discussion of competing ideas and by increasing the People’s participation in
society and in their government.”). Although Keyishian involved the state’s attempt to remove
“subversives” from faculty positions at its institutions, the Court asserted its guiding premise more
broadly to public education in general, holding that, “The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas.’” Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 602. The First Amendment therefore “does not tolerate laws that cast a
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” Id. at 603.
81. Jacques, supra note 80, at 1950.
82. Kaye Pepper at al., Teaching Civic Education in a Democratic Society: A Comparison of Civic
Education in Hungary and the United States, EDUC. FOUND. 29, 30 (2003) (“Education is one of few
means at our disposal to inspire voluntary participation of our citizens. The ability to maintain
democracy rests upon the success of education for democratic citizenship in schools and in our
education of teachers.”); Eli Savit, Note, Can Courts Repair the Crumbling Foundation of Good
Citizenship? An Examination of Potential Legal Challenges to Social Studies Cutbacks in Public
Schools, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1286–87 (2009) (“[B]asic knowledge of history and government is
the price of admission to equal participation in American democracy. An individual who does not know
that the federal Constitution establishes a series of checks and balances is unlikely to understand
contemporary debates about the scope of the Vice President’s power; an individual who does not know
that the Bill of Rights guarantees the freedom of speech may be afraid to publicly voice controversial
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economic challenges, it is imperative that students are empowered
with the skills and knowledge to enable them to foster substantive
solutions to issues impacting their communities. To this end, social
activism plays an essential role in preparing students to be civicallyengaged adults.83 Therefore, it is important to explore the current
legal framework governing students’ free speech rights in K–12
schools to identify barriers to student activism.
It is well established in constitutional jurisprudence that students
do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door.84 The
legal framework for governing students’ First Amendment rights in
public schools is comprised of a series of Supreme Court decisions
that begin with the l943 landmark decision West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette.85 The Barnette decision not only solidified
students’ rights to freedom of expression in schools but forbid school
authorities from compelling students to adhere to a particular
viewpoint.86 Although Barnette served as the gold standard for
assessing students’ free speech rights in K–12 schools for more than
twenty-five years, the modern legal framework is based on the
landmark Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District case and the subsequent trilogy of First Amendment cases.87
The recent controversy surrounding students’ national anthem
protests in K–12 schools at school-sponsored sporting events has
increased public discourse surrounding free speech jurisprudence in
schools.88 Many school leaders find themselves in a quandary as they
views.”); see generally The Brave New World of Fear: Public Education, 15 LEGAL NOTES EDUC. 1
(2003).
83. See Pepper et al., supra note 82, at 33.
84. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 514.
85. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
86. Id. at 642, 644 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”).
87. Miller, supra note 18, at 626.
88. Laura Rene McNeal, From Hoodies to Kneeling During the National Anthem: The Colin
Kaepernick Effect and Its Implications for K–12 Sports, 78 LA. L. REV. 145, 185 (2017) (“The
insurgence of student national anthem protests at school-sponsored athletic events has raised concerns
regarding the effectiveness of existing free speech doctrine in safeguarding students’ First Amendment
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attempt to strike a balance between protecting students’ First
Amendment rights and addressing critics who perceive national
anthem protests as disrespectful to the military.89 Despite the bold,
speech-inspiring rhetoric in Tinker, in which the Court declared,
“[S]tate-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism,” the
Court substantially diminished students’ free speech rights in a
trilogy of cases following Tinker by carving out a series of
exceptions to the material disruption standard.90 These exceptions
significantly increased school administrators’ authority to censor
students’ speech without violating their constitutional rights.91
Collectively, Tinker, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Morse
v. Frederick, and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier establish
today’s modern legal framework for free-speech jurisprudence in K–
12 schools.92 The following discussion provides an overview of the
K–12 freedom of expression legal landscape and highlights the
controversy surrounding the post-Tinker decisions.
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District: The Gold Standard
The Tinker decision is arguably the most important student
freedom-of-expression decision in the past fifty years because it
provides the legal framework for students’ freedom-of-expression
rights.”).
89. Sarah B. Boxer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Trump, Kaepernick and Her Lifelong Love of the Law,
YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/katiecouric/ruth-bader-ginsburg-on-trumpkaepernick-and-her-lifelong-love-of-the-law-132236633.html [https://perma.cc/B5LE-5KCF]; see also
Ryan Wilson, Esiason on Kaepernick Sitting: ‘It’s About as Disrespectful as Any Athlete Has Ever
Been,’ CBS SPORTS (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/esiason-on-kaepernicksitting-its-about-as-disrespectful-as-any-athlete-has-ever-been/ [https://perma.cc/Z9DS-5HAP].
90. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (asserting that student symbolic speech promoting
illegal drug use may be limited); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1988)
(asserting that school authorities may limit school-sponsored activities that are part of the educational
curriculum); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986) (asserting that lewd and
offensive student speech during school-sponsored activities may be censored).
91. See Miller, supra note 18, at 623.
92. McNeal, supra note 88, at 185 (“The legal doctrine established in Tinker, Bethel, Morse, and
Hazelwood concomitantly creates today’s modern legal framework for evaluating students’ free speech
rights.”).
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rights in K–12 schools.93 This case resonates among many free
speech advocates because it sends both a symbolic and substantive
message to school leaders that students do not shed their
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door and school authorities
may not engage in viewpoint discrimination by preemptively limiting
those rights due to apprehension about invoking discomfort or
unpleasantness among others.94 Thus, Tinker solidified the notion
that “First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers
and students.”95
The facts in Tinker centered around two students’ plans to wear
black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.96 The
principals of the schools became aware of the planned protests and
preemptively implemented a policy banning the wearing of
armbands.97 Under the new policy, students who wore armbands to
school would be asked to remove the armbands or be suspended from
school until they returned in compliance with the school policy.98
The protesting students were aware of the school policy banning
armbands, but proceeded with their planned protest and, thus, were
all suspended from school.99 The parents of the petitioners filed a
complaint on behalf of the students in district court alleging that the
principals’ actions violated the students’ First Amendment freedomof-expression rights and requested an injunction to stop any school
disciplinary action.100 The district court dismissed the case, finding
that the principals’ actions were justifiable to prevent a disruption to
the school environment.101 The district court expressly declined to
follow the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in a similar case, which asserted that

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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Id. at 504.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504–05.
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school leaders may not infringe on students’ freedom-of-expression
rights unless the students’ conduct caused a material and substantial
disruption with school discipline and the operation of the school.102
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
without an opinion.103 The parents of the petitioners appealed the
lower courts’ decisions all the way to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and clarified students’ freedom-ofexpression rights in K–12 public schools.104
In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court
decision, holding that school leaders may not limit students’
freedom-of-expression rights unless the conduct in question
materially or substantially disrupts the operation of the school.105 In
the majority opinion, Justice Fortas emphasized that disciplining the
students was inappropriate because the students’ armband protest did
not interfere with the schools’ work or the rights of other students.106
To the contrary, only a few students out of the 18,000-student
population participated in the protests, and there were no reported
threats or acts of violence.107 The Court further reasoned that the
students’ symbolic act constituted pure speech and, thus, was
protected under the First Amendment.108 Therefore, school leaders
are prohibited from restricting symbolic speech simply because it
expresses an unpopular viewpoint or invokes feelings of “discomfort
or unpleasantness” in others.109 The Court also emphasized that not
only did the facts not warrant school authorities to reasonably
102. Id. (quoting Brunside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)) (noting that the lower court
“expressly declined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s holding in a similar case that the wearing of symbols
like the armbands cannot be prohibited unless it ‘materially and substantially interferes with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’”); see also Brunside, 363 F.2d at
748–49 (holding that “the regulation forbidding the wearing of ‘freedom buttons’ on school grounds is
arbitrary and unreasonable, and an unnecessary infringement on the students’ protected right of free
expression in the circumstances revealed by the record.”).
103. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504–05.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 513.
106. Id. at 508.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss2/1

22

McNeal: Hush Don't Say a Word: Safeguarding Student's Freedom of Expressi

2019]

HUSH DON'T SAY A WORD

273

forecast substantial or material disruption to the school activities but
that no such disruptions ever occurred.110
Although it has been almost fifty years since the landmark Tinker
decision, the critiques of the Tinker Court’s expansive approach to
students’ freedom-of-expression rights have varied.111 For example,
some scholars support the dissent’s sentiments that Tinker’s material
disruption standard undermines the ability of schools to maintain
discipline and order by limiting the ability of school administrators to
be in complete control of student conduct and expression.112 Legal
scholars that support this stance reject Tinker’s material disruption
standard asserting that the authority to ascertain appropriate speech
should be determined exclusively by school authorities because
constitutional jurisprudence clearly establishes that students do not
receive the full protections afforded to adults.113 This notion is best
captured in Bethel, in which the Court stated, “[T]he constitutional
rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings.”114 However, another group
of scholars takes an entirely different stance, arguing that the material
110. Id. at 514.
111. David A. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial
Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477, 477 (1981).
112. Id. at 495 (“[T]he responsibility for making [judgments regarding factors related to students’
rights] should lie with local educational authorities, not the courts.”).
113. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)) (acknowledging the principle that the
student’s speech, if given, in a public forum outside of school would have been protected); WalkerSerrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 2003) (suggesting that “at a certain point,
a school child is so young that it might reasonably be presumed the First Amendment does not protect
the kind of speech at issue here. Where that point falls is subject to reasonable debate”); Christi Cassel,
Note, Keep Out of Myspace!: Protecting Students from Unconstitutional Suspensions and Expulsions,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 651–52 (2007) (“Under the United States Constitution, students are
considered persons who possess fundamental rights that the state must respect.”); LoMonte, supra note
76, at 1339 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511); Patrick E. McDonough, Note, Where Good Intentions Go
Bad: Redrafting the Massachusetts Cyberbullying Statute to Protect Student Speech, 46 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 627, 667 (2013) (“Before proposing changes to section 37O, we must recognize the following four
truths when determining the scope of school administrators’ authority regarding student speech:
First, students are considered persons who possess the full panoply of constitutional rights afforded free
expression, and students do not check these constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gates.”). Although
only considered dicta, the Third Circuit noted that “if third graders enjoy rights under Tinker, [sic] those
rights will necessarily be very limited.” Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker, 325 F.3d at 417.
114. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 682.
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disruption standard fails to adequately protect students’ free speech
rights by giving too much deference to school authorities.115 These
divergent perspectives regarding the scope of students’ free speech
rights in K–12 schools illustrate the challenges courts face as they
attempt to balance students’ rights with deference to school
authorities to maintain safe and orderly schools.
B.

Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser: Lewd Speech

The Bethel case makes a significant contribution to free speech
jurisprudence in K–12 schools by clarifying whether school
authorities can censor lewd and offensive speech without violating
students’ freedom of expression rights.116 Prior to the Bethel
decision, there was a great deal of ambiguity among lower courts
regarding whether students may be disciplined for speech that does
not cause a material disruption but violates a school rule.117 It is
important to note that although Bethel did not overturn the Tinker
decision, it did carve out a narrow exception for allowing school
authorities to censor lewd and offensive speech without violating
students’ freedom of expression rights.118

115. Sean R. Nuttall, Symposium, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student Speech
Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1282, 1282 (2008) (“[T]his Note argues that Tinker, while employing strongly
speech-protective rhetoric, nonetheless requires courts to defer to educators’ reasonable determinations
of what speech may cause a substantial disruption and provides only very modest protection for student
speech.”).
116. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 686.
117. Compare Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 176 (9th Cir. 1976) (prohibiting suspending students for
handing out signs to be used in protests, despite the likelihood of disruption, acknowledging “that school
officials may curtail the exercise of First Amendment rights when they can reasonably forecast material
interference or substantial disruption . . . [but,] for discipline resulting from the use of pure speech to
pass muster under the First Amendment, the school officials have the burden to show justification for
their action[;] . . . [a]bsent justification, such as a violation of a statute or school rule, they cannot
discipline a student for exercising those rights”), with Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23, 29–30 (S.D.
Ind. 1981) (“The First Amendment does not require school officials to forestall action until disruption of
the educational system actually occurs . . . . [T]he Court concludes that the forecast on the part of the
defendant that the distribution of the leaflets by the plaintiffs would result in a substantial disruption of
or material interference with the activities of the school unless appropriate action was taken was not
unreasonable.”).
118. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 686.
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In Bethel, a high school student, Fraser, was suspended from
school for three days for lewd and offensive comments he made
during a speech he gave at a school assembly while nominating a
classmate for student office.119 Bethel High School’s policy
governing inappropriate speech explicitly prohibited any conduct that
disrupts the educational learning environment, which included
obscene or profane language or gestures.120 Despite being forewarned
by his teachers that he would receive disciplinary action if he
delivered his speech without making the necessary changes to
comply with the school’s offensive speech policy, Fraser chose to
deliver the speech as planned.121 Fraser challenged the three-day
suspension he received for violating the school’s offensive speech
policy through the school district’s grievance process.122 The hearing
officer upheld the school’s disciplinary action finding that the sexual
innuendos in the speech were “indecent, lewd, and offensive to the
modesty and decency of many of the students and faculty in
attendance” and, thus, were in violation of the school policy.123
Fraser’s father filed suit on his son’s behalf in the Western District of
Washington alleging that the school’s disciplinary action for Fraser’s
speech violated his First Amendment freedom of speech rights.124
The district court ruled in favor of Fraser asserting that the school
district’s offensive speech policy was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad and, therefore, violated Fraser’s freedom of speech
rights.125 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s decision and rejected the school district’s claim that Fraser’s
lewd and offensive speech caused a material disruption to the school
learning environment and that the censorship was necessary to
protect a captive audience of minors from inappropriate speech.126
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
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The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the lower courts’
rulings and held that schools may discipline students for lewd and
offensive speech.127 The Court delineated between the political
speech at issue in Tinker, which was protected, and the lewd and
indecent speech in Bethel, which was unrelated to any political
viewpoint.128 The Court reasoned that it is constitutionally
permissible for school authorities to censor sexually-explicit speech
because it adheres to one of the fundamental purposes of schools,
which is to teach students socially-appropriate behavior.129
Scholarly critiques of Bethel focus on the ambiguity regarding the
scope of its reach and the Court’s departure from Tinker’s speechprotective jurisprudence.130 Some legal scholars posit that the Bethel
decision will have a “chilling effect” on students’ free speech rights
due to the increased deference given to school administrators.131
Whereas, other scholars applaud the Court’s decision for recognizing
the importance of affording school authorities the discretionary
power to maintain an orderly school learning environment.132 The
divergent views on the Court’s stance in Bethel are reflective of the
endemic challenges courts face as they attempt to strike a balance
between preserving students’ First Amendment rights and ensuring
127. Id. at 685.
128. Id. (“Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands in Tinker, [sic] the
penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any political viewpoint. The First Amendment does not
prevent school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s
would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”).
129. Id. at 685–86.
130. See Nina Zollo, Case Comment, Constitutional Law: School Has Broad Discretion to Prohibit
Offensive Student Speech, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 193, 202–03 (1987).
131. Id. at 203 (“By giving schools broad discretion, the instant Court ignores its own warnings of the
chilling effects inherent in prohibiting speech offensive to some members of society.”); see also Phoebe
Graubard, Note, The Expanded Role of School Administrators and Governing Boards in First
Amendment Student Speech Disputes: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 257, 271 (1987) (highlighting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403’s departure from Tinker’s expansive
student free speech rights); Therese Thibodeaux, Note, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser: The
Supreme Court Supports School in Sanctioning Student for Sexual Innuendo in Speech, 33 LOY. L. REV.
516, 525 (1987) (noting that the Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 decision represents a retreat from the Court’s
“progressive stance” to the pre-Tinker ideology of allowing school authorities unbridled deference
supporting the in loco parentis role of schools).
132. Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment
Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 704–05 (1988).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss2/1

26

McNeal: Hush Don't Say a Word: Safeguarding Student's Freedom of Expressi

2019]

HUSH DON'T SAY A WORD

277

that school administrators have the authority to maintain a safe and
disciplined learning environment. This dichotomy continues in the
Morse v. Frederick case.133
C.

Morse v. Frederick: Deterring Illegal Drug Use

The Morse decision makes another contribution to the Court’s
attempt to strike a balance between students’ First Amendment rights
and the authority of schools to limit student speech to maintain a safe
and appropriate learning environment.134 The Court examined
whether it is constitutionally permissible for school authorities to
discipline students for expression that promotes illegal drug use in
violation of a school policy during a school-supervised event.135 The
controversy surrounding this case involved Joseph Frederick, a senior
at Juneau-Douglas High School, who was suspended from school for
violating an established school policy that strictly prohibited “‘any
assembly or public expression that . . . advocates the use of
substances that are illegal to minors.’”136 The incident occurred
during a school-sponsored event in which students were permitted to
watch the Olympic Torch Relay scheduled to proceed along the street
across from the high school.137 This was a historic event because it
was the first time the Olympic Torch Relay had passed through
Alaska.138 The controversy ensued when the plaintiff, Joseph
Frederick, and his friends unveiled a fourteen-foot banner, which
read “BONG HITS 4 JESUS,” as the torchbearer and media passed in
front of them.139 The school principal demanded that the students
take the banner down immediately because it advocated for illegal
drug use in violation of an established school policy.140 All of the
133. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
134. Piotr Banasiak, Morse v. Frederick: Why Content-Based Exceptions, Deference, and Confusion
Are Swallowing Tinker, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1059, 1059 (2009).
135. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
136. Id. at 398.
137. Id. at 397.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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students complied with the principal’s orders except for Frederick.141
The school principal confiscated the banner and suspended Frederick
for ten days for violating the school’s policy against promoting
illegal drug use.142 Frederick challenged the disciplinary action
against him through the school district’s appeal process but to no
avail.143
Frederick filed suit in the District Court of Alaska alleging that the
principal’s disciplinary actions against Frederick’s symbolic speech
violated his First Amendment rights.144 The district court ruled in
favor of the principal and school district reasoning that the principal’s
interpretation of the “BONG HITS 4 JESUS” banner as speech
promoting illegal drug use was reasonable.145 Therefore, based on the
district court’s assessment, the principal’s disciplinary action was
warranted because Frederick violated the school’s antidrug policy
during a school-sponsored event.146 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court’s decision holding that the suspension violated
Frederick’s First Amendment rights.147 In applying Tinker’s material
disruption standard, the circuit court found that Frederick’s speech
was constitutionally protected because there was no substantial
disruption to the school environment.148 The Supreme Court,
however, reached a very different conclusion. In reaching its
decision, the Supreme Court emphasized the key role schools play in
deterring illegal drug use stating, “[D]eterring drug use by
schoolchildren is a valid and terribly important interest” that should
be protected.149 The Court further reasoned that schools should not be
required to turn a blind eye to the promotion of illegal drug use under
the auspices of First Amendment freedom of expression rights.150
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Morse, 551 U.S. at 397–98.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 669.
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 410.
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The Morse decision made a significant impact on free speech
jurisprudence by establishing a third exception to Tinker’s material
disruption standard by allowing school authorities to restrict student
speech that promotes illegal drug use.151 Despite the Court’s laudable
goal of discouraging drug use, the Morse decision continued the
disturbing post-Tinker trend of eroding students’ free speech rights
by expanding the state’s discretionary power to censor student
speech.152 The retreat from Tinker’s expansive free speech
protections continued in the Hazelwood decision.153
D. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: School-Sponsored
Speech
The Court’s retreat from Tinker is further represented in the
Hazelwood decision, which carved out another exception to Tinker’s
material disruption standard.154 In Hazelwood, the Court established
that school authorities can exercise editorial control over schoolsponsored expressive activities as long as their actions are “related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”155 The controversy surrounding the
Hazelwood case involved a group of high school journalism students
alleging that school authorities violated their First Amendment rights
by censoring articles published in the student newspaper, the
Spectrum.156 Students in the school’s journalism class were
responsible for writing articles for publication in the Spectrum
newspaper as part of the school’s educational curriculum.157 All
student articles had to receive approval from the principal prior to
publication to ensure that the content was appropriate for school-age
children.158 The principal reviewed the page proofs and rejected two

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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of the articles for publication.159 The first article, which discussed
divorce and how it impacts students, included a student’s criticism of
his father for not being around enough and for using disrespectful
language towards his mother.160 The principal reasoned that, to
publish the article, they would have to obtain the parents’ permission
to publish and would also have to give the parents the opportunity to
respond to their son’s claims.161 The principal rejected the second
article, which discussed teenage pregnancy, due to privacy concerns
that the student featured in the article may be identified.162 To meet
the tight publication deadline, the principal allowed the school
newspaper to go to print without the two controversial articles.163 The
journalism students filed suit alleging the principal’s censorship of
the student newspaper violated their First Amendment freedom of
expression rights.164
This case is significant in the K–12 legal milieu because it is the
first time the Supreme Court addressed students’ free speech rights in
the context of school-sponsored activities.165 The Court ruled that the
principal’s censorship of the school newspaper did not violate
students’ free speech rights.166 Relying on a public-forum analysis,
the Court reasoned that the school newspaper was clearly part of the
educational curriculum and, thus, could not be categorized as a public
forum for free expression.167 The Court distinguished the speech at
159. Id. at 264.
160. Id. at 263.
161. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 263.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 264.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 270–71.
166. Id. at 273.
167. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 270; see generally Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First
Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving SchoolSponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 722 (2009) (noting that the traditional public forum
doctrine content-based speech restrictions in a designated public forum are subject to strict scrutiny);
William M. Howard, Annotation, Constitutionality of Restricting Public Speech in Street, Sidewalk,
Park, or Other Public Forum—Manner of Restriction, 71 A.L.R.6TH 471, 471 (2012). It is well
established in constitutional jurisprudence that content-based restrictions that occur in traditional public
forums are subject to strict scrutiny. See Howard, supra. The government can normally impose only
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in a public forum. See id. Examples of
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issue in this case—school-sponsored speech—from the political
speech in Tinker.168 Specifically, the speech in controversy in Tinker
was a student’s individual expression that occurred in the school
environment; whereas, in Hazelwood, the speech was considered a
school-sponsored expressive activity and, thus, could reasonably be
perceived as bearing the “imprimatur of the school.”169 For these
reasons, the Court held it was constitutionally permissible for
educators to censor students’ free speech that is part of the
educational curriculum to ensure that speech is appropriate for
students’ particular developmental stage and supports the targetedlearning outcomes.170
The Court’s decision in Hazelwood171 made a significant change to
K–12 free speech jurisprudence through the creation of a new
category of student speech: “school-sponsored expressive
activities.”172 The Hazelwood decision explicitly granted fewer
constitutional protections for students by permitting school
authorities to exercise extensive editorial control over schoolsponsored expressive activities as long as such activities are part of
the educational curriculum.173
A critique of the existing K–12 free speech jurisprudence reveals
two prevailing themes that undermine students’ First Amendment
rights. First, the current legal framework creates barriers to social
activism in schools because the free speech doctrine established in
Tinker, Bethel, Morse, and Hazelwood is too subjective.174
Specifically, Tinker’s material disruption standard and Bethel’s
exception for lewd and offensive speech are heavily dependent upon
each school official’s interpretation of the student’s speech.175 For
public forums are city parks and sidewalks. See Brownstein, supra.
168. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 270–71.
169. Id. at 271.
170. Id. at 273.
171. Id.
172. Hafen, supra note 132, at 685.
173. Robert R. Verchick, Engaging the Spectrum: Civic Virtue and the Protection of Student Voice in
School-Sponsored Forums, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 339, 339 (1991).
174. See Nuttall, supra note 115, at 1313, 1318.
175. See R. George Wright, Symposium, Doubtful Threats and the Limits of Student Speech Rights,
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instance, historically, school officials in more conservative areas such
as the “Bible Belt” are more likely to perceive language related to a
controversial issue as offensive or disruptive than school officials in
more geographically-liberal regions such as California.176 It is this
level of subjectivity that undermines social activism in schools
because the existing free speech doctrine fails to adequately protect
students’ voices from being silenced by school officials in opposition
to the message.177 It is difficult to successfully challenge a school
official’s perception of a student’s expressive conduct when there is
so much subjectivity embedded within those decisions.178 Another
prevalent theme emerging from existing K–12 free speech
jurisprudence is the Court’s restrictive—as opposed to expansive—
approach to students’ First Amendment rights.179 The Court’s stance
in Tinker and the subsequent free speech decisions all limit—as
opposed to expand—students’ free speech rights by giving public
school officials more discretionary power to censor student speech by
creating exceptions for lewd speech, speech that endorses illegal drug
use, and speech related to the education curriculum.180 The two
aforementioned themes illuminate the judiciary’s failure to
adequately safeguard students’ free speech rights. Many states
pursued a statutory solution to address the Court’s failure to protect
students from unwarranted censorship.181

42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 691, 708–09 (2009).
176. See Thibodeaux, supra note 131, at 525.
177. See Zollo, supra note 130, at 198.
178. Wright, supra note 173, at 691.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 707–08.
181. Demi Vitkute, A Nationwide Movement Protecting the Student Press from Censorship Gains
Momentum, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Sept. 8, 2017),
https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news/nationwide-movement-protecting-studentpress-censorship-gains-moment [https://perma.cc/MMZ6-QLEL].
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III. States’ Responses to Abridgement of Student Speech: The Birth
of Anti-Hazelwood statutes
The Constitution expressly provides that states and the legislative
body may not abridge the right to free speech.182 To this end, the
Court established a legal framework, Tinker’s material disruption
standard, to help safeguard students’ free speech rights in K–12
schools.183 However, as previously highlighted, despite Tinker’s
speech-protective rhetoric, in practice the material disruption
standard provides students with limited free speech protections due to
the series of exceptions imposed by the trilogy of cases following the
Tinker decision.184 Collectively, the Court’s decisions in Bethel,
Hazelwood, and Morse have undermined Tinker’s expansive
approach to safeguarding students’ freedom-of-speech rights and
afforded school administrators too much discretion in determining
when censoring student speech is constitutionally permissible.185
The Supreme Court’s departure from the lower courts’ reliance on
Tinker’s material disruption standard marked a significant shift in K–
12 free speech jurisprudence and laid the foundation for states to
respond with the passage of anti-Hazelwood legislation to safeguard
students’ free speech rights in K–12 schools.186 The purpose of antiHazelwood statutes was to reverse the effects of the Hazelwood
decision to the greatest extent possible by restoring Tinker’s broad
speech-protective stance to student publications and, in some states,
other forms of expression as well.187 It is well-established
182. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
183. See Nuttall, supra note 115, at 1285.
184. Id. at 1282, 1293 (“Scholars view Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
as the high-water mark of student speech protection and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions,
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v.
Frederick (the Bong Hits case) as a considerable retreat from this mark.”).
185. Id. at 1288–89.
186. Chris Sanders, Censorship 101: Anti-Hazelwood Laws and the Preservation of Free Speech at
Colleges and Universities, 58 ALA. L. REV. 159, 168 (2006).
187. Tyler J. Buller, The State Response to Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 66 ME. L. REV. 89, 116 (2013)
(“In short, the data demonstrate that anti-Hazelwood statutes are, at least in large part, fulfilling
their purpose. The increased criticism of school officials and larger number of controversial editorials in
Tinker states both indicate the student press is better able to fulfill its watchdog function, develop
today’s students into tomorrow’s engaged citizens, and promote the free flow of student ideas when
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constitutional jurisprudence that, although states may not restrict
one’s constitutional rights, they may expand those rights through
state legislation, such as anti-Hazelwood statutes.188 Support for
states’ collective resistance to the Hazelwood decision included
student journalists and free speech advocates who argued that the
Hazelwood decision gave school authorities free reign to usurp
students’ free speech rights and, thus, was contrary to the spirit and
purpose of the First Amendment.189
Although the number of anti-Hazelwood statutes passed has
increased over the years, not every state has passed a law.190
Currently, there are sixteen states that have adopted anti-Hazelwood
statutes.191 Other states’ attempts to pass student free speech laws
have either failed to progress through the political process or after a
gubernatorial veto.192 The majority of states with anti-Hazelwood
statutes have modeled their statutes after the California Student Free
Press Freedom Act.193 The California-style laws empower students
with the right to decide what content merits publication and restore
Tinker’s expansive approach to protecting any form of free speech
that does not cause a material disruption to the school learning
environment.194 Section 48950 of the California Student Free Press
Freedom Act provides:
(a) A school district operating one or more high schools, a
charter school, or a private secondary school shall not make
or enforce a rule subjecting a high school pupil to
protected from administrative censorship.”).
188. Bruce L. Plopper, A Synthesis Model for Passing State Student Press Legislation, 51
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. EDUCATOR 61, 61 (1996).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Arkansas Student Publications Act, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-1201 to -1204 (West 2018);
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48907, 48950, 66301, 94367 (West 2018) (prohibiting administrators within the
University of California system from disciplining students solely on the basis of their speech); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-120 (West 2018); IOWA CODE § 280.22 (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 72-1504 to -1506 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 82 (West 2018).
192. Plopper, supra note 186, at 63–64.
193. Sanders, supra note 184, at 174.
194. Id.
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disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is
speech or other communication that, when engaged in
outside of the campus, is protected from governmental
restriction by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution or Section 2 of Article I of the California
Constitution.
(b) A pupil who is enrolled in a school at the time that the
school has made or enforced a rule in violation of
subdivision (a) may commence a civil action to obtain
appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief as determined
by the court. Upon motion, a court may award attorney’s
fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a civil action pursuant to this
section.195
This Act attempts not only to protect students’ free speech rights
but also to shield them from disciplinary action by school authorities
who disapprove of their speech.196 Additionally, the Act serves to
deter unlawful violations of students’ freedom-of-expression rights
by explicitly providing students with legal redress for any harm or
injury caused.197 Although most states model their anti-Hazelwood
legislation after California’s Student Free Press Freedom Act, it is
important to note that these types of statutes are not universal and,
thus, vary from state to state.198 Some statutes provide protections to
student expression in general, whereas others are narrowly tailored to
apply only to student journalists.199 For example, the Massachusetts
statute applies Tinker’s broad protective stance to all forms of
students’ freedom of expression.200 It provides: “The right of students
to freedom of expression in the public schools of the commonwealth
shall not be abridged, provided that such right shall not cause any

195.
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disruption or disorder within the school.”201 Likewise, Vermont’s
anti-Hazelwood statute ensures “free speech and free press
protections for both public school students and students at public
institutions of higher education in this [s]tate in order to encourage
students to become educated, informed, and responsible members of
society.”202 However, the Arkansas Student Publications Act only
applies to student publications.203 It provides that the following are
unauthorized publications:
(1) Publications that are obscene as to minors, as defined
by state law;
(2) Publications that are libelous or slanderous, as defined
by state law;
(3) Publications that constitute an unwarranted invasion of
privacy, as defined by state law; or
(4) Publications that so incite students as to create:
(A) A clear and present danger of the commission of
unlawful acts on school premises;
(B) The violation of lawful school regulations; or
(C) The material and substantial disruption of the orderly
operation of the school.204
Similarly, Maryland’s Student New Voices Act only expands
student free speech protections to cover school-sponsored student
publications.205 It states, “A student journalist may exercise freedom
of speech and freedom of the press in school-sponsored media.”206
Although anti-Hazelwood statutes vary regarding the level and
type of protections afforded to students, they all share the underlying
premise, which is to shield students from unlawful infringements of

201.
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MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 82 (West 2018).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 180 (West 2018).
Arkansas Student Publications Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-1204 (West 2018).
Id.
Id.
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-121 (West 2018).
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their free speech rights.207 Anti-Hazelwood statutes, such as the one
enacted in Massachusetts that reinstates Tinker’s broad protective
stance, provide the best statutory protections for unlawful censorship
of students’ expressive activities, political speech, and symbolic
speech because they minimize the discretionary power of school
officials.208 However, restrictive anti-Hazelwood statutes, like those
enacted in Arkansas and Maryland, fail to adequately protect students
due to their limited approach, which only expands students’ free
speech rights regarding school-sponsored student publications.209 All
other forms of student expression may be subject to censorship.210
Thus, students who attend public schools in states with restrictive
anti-Hazelwood statutes leave the fate of their free speech protections
to the whims of capricious school officials.211 Despite the
aforementioned shortcomings of some of the narrower antiHazelwood statutes, the evolution of this innovative statutory
solution to expanding students’ free speech rights provides a
substantive path to addressing the current wave of unlawful
censorship experienced by students attempting to engage in social
activism in K–12 schools.
IV. A Statutory Solution to Safeguarding Students’ Free Speech
Rights
The current K–12 free speech jurisprudence established in Tinker,
Bethel, Morse, and Hazelwood fails to adequately protect students’
First Amendment freedom-of-expression rights to engage in political
speech, expressive activities, and symbolic conduct. First, Tinker’s
material disruption standard is too subjective because what one
school authority may deem as disruptive, another may categorize as
simply child’s play.212 The unbridled discretionary power wielded by
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
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school authorities to interpret what constitutes a material disruption
has served as a catalyst for inequitable disciplinary practices
throughout K–12 schools.213 For example, a recent Oklahoma School
District discipline audit revealed grave discrepancies regarding
disciplinary sanctions within its school system.214 The audit found
that the average length of suspensions varied widely among schools
for the same offense.215
Additionally, the audit found that certain schools were more likely
to issue alternative education program referrals than others for the
same infraction.216 The results of the Oklahoma School District
discipline audit are not an anomaly but rather reflect the larger issue
of gross disparities in disciplinary sanctions in school districts across
the country.217 A national report released by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office found that disciplinary disparities were
widespread and persistent regardless of the type of public school
attended, level of school poverty, or type of school property.218
Abuses of discretionary authority by school administrators due to the
high subjectivity in determining what qualifies as a material
disruption is perpetuating an inequitable disciplinary system that
subjects students to arbitrary and capricious actions.219
Another harmful consequence of the establishment of a
subjective—as opposed to objective—standard for Tinker’s material
disruption standard is the increased likelihood of students’ free
speech rights being violated due to viewpoint discrimination.220 The
rise in instances of viewpoint discrimination in response to social
activism in schools is highly problematic because viewpoint
213. See generally Tim Willert, Oklahoma City School District Audit Finds Widespread
Discrepancies, NEWSOK (Apr. 20, 2015), https://newsok.com/article/5412087/oklahoma-city-schooldistrict-discipline-audit-finds-widespread-discrepancies [https://perma.cc/RNU3-YEW2].
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. K–12 EDUCATION REPORT, supra note 69.
218. Id.
219. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969); K–12 EDUCATION
REPORT, supra note 69.
220. John E. Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, 77 UMKC L. REV. 569, 603 (2009).
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neutrality is one of the core principles of First Amendment
protections.221 The Court recognizes the important role viewpoint
neutrality plays in preserving free speech protections. This is evident
by the Court’s application of strict scrutiny in evaluating viewpoint
discrimination, as opposed to one of the lower standards of review.
The significant role Tinker’s material disruption standard plays in
creating an environment conducive to viewpoint discrimination must
be addressed. It is evident by the inconsistency among school
authorities’ responses to student activism in schools—that some
school leaders are limiting students’ symbolic speech simply because
they disagree with the content. For example, in Michigan a student
who wore a shirt with the phrase “international terrorist” and a
picture of President Bush in the background was forced to turn his
shirt inside-out, even though the symbolic speech did not cause a
material disruption.222 Similarly, a New York student was forced to
remove a Palestinian flag pin from his shirt or be subjected to
disciplinary sanctions, despite the fact that the symbolic expression
did not cause any level of disruption to the educational
environment.223 This type of censorship based on the viewpoints of
school authorities demonstrates that school administrators are not
immune from allowing their moral convictions to influence their
disciplinary actions. This type of viewpoint discrimination
undermines one of the fundamental purposes of the First
Amendment, which is to promote the uninhibited exchange of
ideas.224 This notion was clearly expressed by the Court’s opinion in
221. Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 702 (2011)
(“Although there is very little agreement about the core ‘purpose’ of the First Amendment, there is near
unanimity that one such purpose—and certainly a core function—is to protect private viewpoints from
government regulation.”).
222. Tamar Lewin, High School Tells Student to Remove Antiwar Shirt, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/26/us/high-school-tells-student-to-remove-antiwar-shirt.html
[https://perma.cc/JK4V-C3DL]. A federal judge subsequently ruled that the student could wear the Tshirt. Associated Press, Student May Wear Bush ‘Terrorist’ Shirt, FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 2, 2003),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/10/02/student-may-wear-bush-terrorist-shirt.html
[https://perma.cc/WS39-CC7P].
223. Lewin, supra note 220.
224. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately

Published by Reading Room,

39

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1

290

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

Shelton v. Tucker that proclaimed, “The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools.”225 Therefore, schools should be a
quintessential marketplace of ideas where students are trained on
how to actively participate in democracy by creating an environment
where the robust exchange of ideas that challenge and critique
existing ideologies are not only welcomed but encouraged.
Furthermore, Hazelwood, Bethel, and Morse do not provide
adequate constitutional protections for students who engage in
symbolic conduct, political speech, and expressive activities. In all
three cases, the Supreme Court carved out narrow exceptions that
permit school authorities to censor student speech, none of which are
applicable to the type of speech at issue in national anthem protests
and school walkouts.226 For example, the performance of students
who play on school-sponsored sports teams are not part of the
educational curriculum because their athletic performance is not used
to assess their academic achievement.227 Likewise, the Bethel
exception for lewd and indecent speech is not applicable to school
walkouts or national anthem protests because the speech is not lewd
or indecent but rather political speech intended to communicate the
need for controlling access to guns and addressing police brutality.228
Lastly, the Morse standard, which established that school authorities
may regulate student speech that promotes illegal drug use, is distinct
from the symbolic speech conveyed through national anthem protests
and school walkouts, which are completely unrelated to drug use.229

prevail . . . .”).
225. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
226. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986).
227. McNeal, supra note 88, at 186.
228. Id. at 174–75.
229. Id. at 185–85.
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A. A Legislative Solution to Safeguarding Students’ Free Speech
Rights
The current legal framework governing free speech rights in K–12
schools fails to protect students’ symbolic conduct, political speech,
and expressive activities in K–12 schools. The state should not be
permitted to censor or prohibit students’ speech to avoid the
discomfort or unpleasantness that is often associated with an
unpopular viewpoint.230 This article argues that anti-Hazelwood
statutes should be amended to include protections for students’ free
speech rights in K–12 schools. Because not all fifty states have
passed anti-Hazelwood statutes,231 it is imperative that states without
anti-Hazelwood statutes pass this important legislation to safeguard
students’ free speech rights. The proposed legislative solution will
fully restore Tinker’s broad free speech protections to students in K–
12 schools and address the current inconsistency in how school
authorities interpret students’ free speech rights. Under the proposed
legislative solution, it is imperative that the suggested amendments
explicitly prohibit viewpoint discrimination. The state can affirm
students’ rights to freedom of expression without having to endorse
any particular viewpoint.232 It is also imperative that amended
statutes include disciplinary action for disruptive speech and provide
students with legal redress for any harm or injury resulting from
unlawful censorship. Lastly, the proposed amendments to antiHazelwood statutes should apply to all forms of student expression,
not just school-sponsored media (i.e., school walkouts and national
anthem protests). The proposed model anti-Hazelwood statute reads
as follows:
The General Assembly finds that freedom of expression and
freedom of the press are fundamental principles in our democratic
230. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (“In order for the State
in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be
able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”).
231. Sanders, supra note 184, at 168.
232. Id. at 166–67.
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society granted to every citizen of the nation by the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution and to every resident of this State. These
freedoms provide all citizens, including students, with the right to
engage in robust and uninhibited discussion of issues.
(a) The right of students to freedom of expression in the
public schools within this state shall not be abridged,
provided that such right shall not cause any disruption or
disorder within the school. Freedom of expression shall
include, without limitation, the rights and responsibilities of
students, collectively and individually, (a) to express their
views through speech, symbols, and conduct; (b) to write,
publish, and disseminate their views; and (c) to assemble
peaceably on school property for the purpose of expressing
their opinions.
(b) A school district operating one or more high schools, a
charter school, or a private secondary school shall not make
or enforce a rule subjecting a high school pupil to
disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is
speech or other communication that, when engaged in
outside of the campus, is protected from governmental
restriction by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution or state Constitution.
(c) A pupil who is enrolled in a school at the time that the
school has made or enforced a rule in violation of
subdivision (a) may commence a civil action to obtain
appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief as determined
by the court. Upon motion, a court may award attorney’s
fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a civil action pursuant to this
section.
(d) This section does not apply to a private secondary
school that is controlled by a religious organization, to the
extent that the application of this section would not be
consistent with the religious tenets of the organization.
(e) This section does not prohibit the imposition of

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss2/1
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discipline for harassment, threats, or intimidation, unless
constitutionally protected.
The proposed amendment to anti-Hazelwood statutes should be
implemented because students should be free to exercise their rights
without interference from the state. Schools certainly can educate,
but they cannot indoctrinate based upon a prescribed orthodoxy. As
Justice Fortas eloquently stated in Tinker:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves
of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute
authority over their students. Students in school as well as
out of school are “persons” under our Constitution. They
are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must
respect, just as they themselves must respect their
obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate.233
The proposed legislative solution helps solidify the key role
schools play in protecting and advancing the values of the First
Amendment by sending a symbolic and substantive message to
school authorities that students do not shed their free speech rights at
the schoolhouse door. Ideally, schools should teach students how to
become civically-engaged citizens by affording them the opportunity
to transcend their individual understanding of controversial issues
such as gun control by exchanging ideas and perspectives with a
diverse spectrum of voices within their schools and communities.234
According to Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren, school environments
must encourage critical evaluation and creative reasoning to equip
students with the knowledge and skills to actively participate in

233. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
234. Verchick, supra note 171, at 341.
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democracy.235 To this end, anti-Hazelwood statutes support civic
education by ensuring that students will be afforded the opportunity
to not only learn about their freedom-of-expression rights but apply
that knowledge in an encouraging environment.236
It is important to acknowledge that some legal scholars posit that
we should pursue a judicial solution—the Supreme Court’s explicit
prohibition of viewpoint discrimination—as opposed to a legislative
approach to protecting students’ free speech rights in relation to
school-sponsored speech.237 The reasoning behind this approach is
that eliminating viewpoint discrimination will indirectly shield
students from infringements on their freedom-of-expression rights by
school authorities who hold opposing views.238 However, as one
scholar illustrated, a judicial solution is not the most efficient path to
protecting students from viewpoint discrimination considering that
the Supreme Court has agreed to hear only four student free speech
cases in the past forty years.239 In light of the widespread student
activism permeating K–12 schools and the inconsistency with which
school authorities are protecting students’ free speech rights, we
cannot afford to remain idle in hopes that the Court will choose to
intervene by issuing a writ of certiorari in the near future. Each day
that passes without a substantive legal solution in place to safeguard
students’ freedom-of-expression rights leaves students susceptible to
unlawful censorship by school authorities.240 Therefore, the proposed
legislative solution is better than a judicial solution because it offers
the most expeditious path toward protecting students’ free speech
rights.

235. Id. at 362.
236. Id.
237. Evan Mayor, Note, The “Bong Hits” Case and Viewpoint Discrimination: A State Law Answer
to Protecting Unpopular Student Viewpoints, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 799, 816 (2009).
238. Id. at 812–13.
239. Id. at 816.
240. Id. at 817.
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Limitations of Proposed Solution

Despite all of the potential benefits of the proposed amendment to
existing anti-Hazelwood statutes, it is important to acknowledge the
limitations and negative outcomes that may result. First, nearly all of
the anti-Hazelwood statutes lack independent enforcement
mechanisms to help ensure compliance.241 Only one state’s statute,
Oregon, contains a penalty for violating the statute.242 The penalty
provisions allow students to pursue a direct cause of action that arises
solely from the anti-Hazelwood statute.243 The absence of an
independent enforcement mechanism may send a symbolic and
substantive message to school authorities that impermissible
infringements on students’ free speech rights will not be taken
seriously. Second, this approach will not protect all students’ free
speech rights because not all fifty states currently have antiHazelwood statutes to enact the proposed amendments, and even
those states with existing statutes may not be interested in making
any additional changes.244 Furthermore, those states in which free
speech advocates attempt to garner the support to pass the proposed
legislation will likely experience a great deal of challenges due to the
current tumultuous political climate.245
Despite the aforementioned challenges, amending existing antiHazelwood statutes offers the best path toward safeguarding students’
free speech rights. The existing practice of turning a blind eye to the
inconsistent application of students’ First Amendment rights is
harmful to students and reduces them to second-class citizens.246 We
have a moral and ethical responsibility to ensure that students’ rights
to engage in symbolic conduct, political speech, and other expressive
activities are not restricted by the state.

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
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CONCLUSION
Ideally, public schools should prepare children on how to live and
fully participate in a democratic society. According to a well-known
education theorist, one of the primary purposes of education is to
promote democratic equality, and therefore, schools should be
designed to prepare students for political roles and active citizenry.247
This notion is further captured in a statement by Justice Brennan in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of New York:
[T]he First Amendment . . . does not tolerate laws that cast
a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. “The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools.” . . . “No one
should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is
played by those who guide and train our youth.”248
Regardless of whether one agrees with President Trump’s
ideology, American citizens, which includes students, should not be
bullied out of their constitutional freedoms nor should they be denied
future opportunities for expressing an idea in a way that is unpopular
or offensive to others. School authorities have a moral and ethical
responsibility to stand in support of students’ right to expression even
if opposed to students’ views on any particular issue. Any form of
discipline for students’ expressive activities, such as kneeling during
the national anthem, constitutes viewpoint discrimination, which is
strictly prohibited by the Constitution.249 It is imperative that school
authorities empower—as opposed to oppress—students’ political
speech, symbolic conduct, and expressive activities. We cannot
continue to allow school authorities to circumvent students’
247. David F. Labaree, Public Goods, Private Goods: The American Struggle Over Educational
Goals, 34 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 39, 42 (1997).
248. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
249. Blocher, supra note 219, at 702.
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substantive freedom-of-expression rights under the guise of neutrality
when they are clear instances of viewpoint discrimination.250
One of the essential tenets for freedom of expression jurisprudence
is the promotion of a marketplace of ideas that encourages freedom
of expression from diverse perspectives.251 Therefore, any attempts to
undermine or minimize individuals’ efforts to express their diverse
perspectives makes a mockery of the First Amendment, which is
arguably one of our most cherished constitutional rights.252 This
notion is best captured in the following quote by Justice Fortas:
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the
campus, that deviates from the views of another person
may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our
Constitution says we must take this risk, and our history
says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of
openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of
the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and
live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious,
society.253

250. Cedric Merlin Powell, Critiquing Neutrality: Critical Perspectives on Schools, the First
Amendment, and Affirmative Action in a “Post-Racial” World, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 105, 109
(2013) (“Neutrality functions in much the same way under the First Amendment. Like the school
decisions discussed above, the emphasis is on process values rather than substantive rights. The Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence exhibits a pronounced distaste for the regulation of the content of
speech . . . .”).
251. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
252. See id. at 508–09.
253. Id.
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